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HANDS ACROSS THE BORDER: 
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT  
OF SECURE ACCOMMODATION ORDERS 
In the Matter of X (A Child), In the Matter of Y (A Child) 1 * 
 
Introduction 
There arose in conjoined cases before Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division of the 
English High Court of Justice, important cross-border issues in the matter of the making of secure 
accommodation orders for teenage children. The cases, In the Matter of X (A Child), In the Matter of 
Y (A Child), raised the same issues, namely, first, the jurisdiction of an English court to make a secure 
accommodation order for the purpose of placing in a secure unit in Scotland a young person resident 
in England; and, secondly, the question of recognition and enforcement in Scotland of such an English 
order. Sir James summarised the issues thus: 
 
“Can the court in country A (in the present case, England) make an order to take effect in 
country B (in this case, Scotland)? If so, will such an order be recognised and enforced in 
country B (Scotland)? The first question is to be determined by the law of country A 
(England); the second is one to be determined by the law of country B (Scotland).”2 
 
The case of X concerned a girl, then aged 16 years, living in the area of Cumbria County Council, and 
that of Y concerned a boy, then aged 15 years, resident within the authority of Blackpool Borough 
Council. Each party was the subject of care proceedings in England, and the Councils, respectively, 
sought authority under section 25 of the Children Act 1989 to place the young person in secure 
accommodation in Scotland, there being no available unit in England. A judicial order was made in 
proceedings relating to each party, giving the relevant Council permission to invoke for this purpose 
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, and authorising the placing of each child in a secure 
accommodation unit in Scotland until 29 July 2016. Both matters having been listed for further 
consideration, the two cases came before Sir James Munby on 28 July 2016. The High Court decision, 
handed down on 12 September 2016, provides a noteworthy commentary on lacunae in the intra-UK 
legislative framework pertaining to secure accommodation orders. 
 
  
                                                          
*J M Carruthers and E B Crawford, University of Glasgow 
1 [2016] EWHC 2271 (Fam). 
2 Ibid., para 12. 
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The legislative framework 
Part III of the Children Act 1989 (“Support for Children and Families provided by Local Authorities 
in England”) (hereinafter “1989 Act”) narrates in section 25 (“Use of accommodation for restricting 
liberty”) the circumstances in which a child who is being looked after by a local authority may be 
placed, and, if placed, may be kept, in secure accommodation in England (emphasis added). A child 
who is being looked after by a local authority in England or Wales may not be placed, and, if placed, 
may not be kept, in secure accommodation unless it appears, “(a) that—(i) he has a history of 
absconding and is likely to abscond from any other description of accommodation; and (ii) if he 
absconds, he is likely to suffer significant harm; or (b) that if he is kept in any other description of 
accommodation he is likely to injure himself or other persons.”3 Ex facie the terms of section 25 do 
not authorise an English judge to make a section 25 order placing a child in Scotland.4  
 
By Schedule 2 to the 1989 Act, paragraph 19 (“Arrangements to assist children to live abroad”), a 
local authority may arrange for, or assist in arranging for, any child in their care to live outside 
England and Wales only with approval of the court.5 Such approval will be granted only if the court is 
satisfied that:6    
 
(a) living outside England and Wales would be in the child’s best interests; 
(b) suitable arrangements have been, or will be, made for his reception and welfare in the 
country in which he will live; 
(c) the child has consented to living in that country; and 
(d) every person who has parental responsibility for the child has consented to his living in 
that country. 
 
As Sir James explained in the instant case, “It is difficult to see how the requirements of paragraph 19 
of Schedule 2 to the 1989 Act will ever be satisfied where the child is to be sent out of the jurisdiction 




                                                          
3 Section 25(1), 1989 Act. cf. Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, s 119. 
4 Section 25(1), as amended by Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 (Consequential Amendments) 
Regulations 2016 (2016/413), reg 86(a)(ii). See also In the Matter of X (A Child), In the Matter of Y (A Child), 
per Sir James, para 28. 
5 The High Court or the family court (s 92(7), 1989 Act). 
6 Para 19(3), Sch 2, 1989 Act. 
7 Para 29. 
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In Scotland, the placing of a child in secure accommodation8 pursuant to a compulsory supervision 
order9 is regulated by the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (hereinafter “2011 Act”), sections 
151–153.10 By section 190 of the 2011 Act (“Effect of orders made outwith Scotland”), the Scottish 
Ministers may by regulations make provision for a specified non-Scottish order (i.e. an order made by 
a court in England and Wales, or in Northern Ireland), which appears to them to correspond to a 
compulsory supervision order, to have effect as if it were such an order. The relevant statutory 
instrument with regard to the recognition and enforcement in Scotland of orders in family matters 
made by courts in England is The Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (Transfer of Children to 
Scotland – Effect of Orders made in England and Wales or Northern Ireland) Regulations 201311 
(hereinafter “2013 Regulations”). The 2013 Regulations, made in exercise of the powers conferred by 
section 190 of the 2011 Act, apply where a child is transferred to Scotland from England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland, in circumstances where the child is subject to an order made in the remitting 
jurisdiction giving an authority care or supervisory responsibility for the child. The 2013 Regulations 
provide for the orders to have effect in Scotland as if they were compulsory supervision orders.  
Despite the apparent usefulness of the 2013 Regulations, there is a difficulty as regards the 
recognition and enforcement in Scotland of a secure accommodation order made in England. The 
scope of application of the 2013 Regulations is strictly limited to the circumstances prescribed by 
regulation 3 (“Effect of care orders made in England and Wales” 12), which, importantly in the instant 
case, do not cover secure accommodation orders.13  
                                                          
8 Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s 85 defines “secure accommodation authorisation” as meaning an 
authorisation enabling the child to be placed and kept in secure accommodation within a residential 
establishment. 
9 A compulsory supervision order means an order including any of the measures available under s 83(2) of the 
2011 Act, comprising, inter alia, “(2) …(a) a requirement that the child reside at a specified place, (b) a direction 
authorising the person who is in charge of a place specified under paragraph (a) to restrict the child’s liberty to 
the extent that the person considers appropriate having regard to the measures included in the order,…(d) a 
movement restriction condition, (e) a secure accommodation authorisation, …”. 
10 See also the Secure Accommodation (Scotland) Regulations 2013 (SSI 2013/205). 
11 SSI 2013/99. With regard to the recognition and enforcement in England of orders in family matters made by 
courts in Scotland, see The Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (Consequential and Transitional Provisions 
and Savings) Order 2013 (SI 2013/1465). See also In the matter of X, In the matter of Y, per Sir James Munby at 
para 58. 
12 Namely:  
(a) a child is subject to a [“full” – per Sir James, para 64] care order made under section 31(1)(a) of the 1989 
Act [on the application of any local authority or authorised person, the court may make an order placing the 
child with respect to whom the application is made in the care of a designated local authority]; 
(b) the court has given approval under paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 2 to the 1989 Act to the local authority (“the 
home local authority”) to arrange, or assist in arranging, for the child to live in Scotland; 
(c) the local authority for the area in which the child is to reside, or has moved to, in Scotland (“the receiving 
local authority”) has, through the Principal Reporter, notified the court in writing that it agrees to take over the 
care of the child; and 
(d) the home local authority has notified the court that it agrees to the receiving local authority taking over the 
care of the child. 
See also regulation 4 re. effect of supervision order and education supervision orders made in England. 
13 Sir James Munby, para 64. See, conversely, art 7 of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 
(Consequential and Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2013 (SI 2013/1465). By art 7(1), where a 
compulsory supervision order or interim compulsory supervision order made by a court in Scotland contains a 




The inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court 
The President of the Family Division, having found that an English judge has no power to make a 
secure accommodation order under section 25 of the 1989 Act to have a child placed in a secure unit 
in Scotland, proceeded to consider if the desired outcome could be achieved by means of the inherent 
parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court.   
The origins of the parens patriae jurisdiction lie in the protective duty of the Sovereign to “look to the 
maintenance and education (as far as it has the means of judging) of all his subjects”.14 Lord Denning 
in the English Court of Appeal recognised the continued existence of this basis of jurisdiction in In re 
P(GE) (An Infant).15 A modern example of its use in a cross-border child law matter is the UK 
Supreme Court decision in A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International 
Child Abduction Centre and others intervening).16 In the instant case, Sir James found supportive 
authority, in the particular matter of placement in secure accommodation in circumstances where 
jurisdiction under section 25 of the 1989 Act was not available, in the cases of In Re B (Secure 
accommodation: Inherent jurisdiction) (No 1)17 and Re B (Secure accommodation: Inherent 
jurisdiction) (No 2).18 
In invoking the inherent jurisdiction, the conditions set out in section 100 of the 1989 Act 
(“Restrictions on use of wardship jurisdiction”) must be satisfied, including, in particular, the 
requirement that the result which the local authority wishes to achieve could not be achieved other 
than by use of the inherent jurisdiction.19 Sir James found no “jurisdictional obstacle”20 in the 1989 
Act, taking the view that neither the mere existence of the statutory scheme, nor its substantive detail, 
ousted the common law prerogative. He concluded that,  
“It follows … that, in principle, a judge in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction can make an 
order directing the placement of a child in secure accommodation in Scotland. So too, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
requirement of the type mentioned in s 83(2)(a) of the 2011 Act (that is, a requirement that the child reside at a 
specified place), the place specified in that requirement may be a place in England or Wales. By art 7(2), where 
a compulsory supervision order or interim compulsory supervision order contains a direction of the type 
mentioned in section 83(2)(b) of the 2011 Act and the place at which the child is required to reside in 
accordance with the order is a place in England or Wales, the order is authority for the person in charge of that 
place to restrict the child’s liberty to the extent that the person considers appropriate having regard to the 
measures included in the order. 
14 Hope v Hope (1854) 4 De GM & G 328, per Lord Cranworth LC at 344 – 345. 
15 [1965] Ch. 568, at 582. 
16 [2014] A.C. 1. 
17 [2013] EWHC 4654 (Fam). 
18 [2013] EWHC 4655 (Fam). See also Re AB (A Child: deprivation of liberty) [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam), 
[2016] 1 WLR 1160. 
19 Section 100(4), Children Act 1989. 
20 Para 34. 
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principle, a judge in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction can make an order directing the 
placement of a child in non-secure accommodation in Scotland.”21   
There is a caveat: any judge seeking to exercise the inherent jurisdiction in this particular matter must 
ensure compliance with the requirements of article 5 (“Right to liberty and security”) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The practical implications of a cross-border order engaged the 
attention of Sir James, who, conscious that any order directing the detention of a child should contain 
additional directions designed to facilitate easy and regular access between parents and child, was 
anxious to ensure, in the case of X, that the burden and cost of travelling from Cumbria to the secure 
unit in Scotland did not fall too heavily on X’s mother.22 Sir James was satisfied that a secure 
accommodation order for placement of X in Scotland would be article 5-compliant. 
The President having concluded that it was competent for the court to exercise its inherent 
jurisdiction, the question arose whether or not the resulting English order would be recognised and 
enforced in Scotland. 
 
Non-applicability of Brussels II bis23 intra-UK 
Article 66 of Brussels II bis, entitled “Member States with two or more legal systems”, provides that, 
 
With regard to a Member State in which two or more systems of law or sets of rules 
concerning matters governed by this Regulation apply in different territorial units:  
(a) any reference to habitual residence in that Member State shall refer to habitual residence 
in a territorial unit;  
(b) any reference to nationality, or in the case of the United Kingdom ‘domicile', shall refer to 
the territorial unit designated by the law of that State;  
(c) any reference to the authority of a Member State shall refer to the authority of a territorial 
unit within that State which is concerned;  
(d) any reference to the rules of the requested Member State shall refer to the rules of the 
territorial unit in which jurisdiction, recognition or enforcement is invoked. 
 
The article differs from those in the Rome I and Rome II regulations24 entitled “States with more than 
one legal system”, which provide, mutatis mutandis, that,  
                                                          
21 Para 47. 
22 Paras 49 – 50.  
23 Council Regulation (EC) No.2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 
No.1347/2000. 
24 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), art 22; and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European 




“1. Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own rules of law in 
respect of [contractual/non-contractual] obligations, each territorial unit shall be considered as 
a country for the purposes of identifying the law applicable under this Regulation.  
2. A Member State where different territorial units have their own rules of law in respect of 
[contractual/non-contractual] obligations shall not be required to apply this Regulation to 
conflicts solely between the laws of such units.”25 
 
There is no explicit provision in Brussels II bis stating that a Member State having two or more legal 
systems shall not be required to apply the regulation to conflicts solely between the laws of such units. 
The question whether or not Brussels II bis operates as between the different legal systems of the UK 
therefore has been a subject of debate.26 First instance judges have reached different conclusions on 
the point.27 Sir James, in the instant case, referred to various authorities from England,28 Northern 
Ireland,29 and Scotland.30 Notably, the Scottish authorities cited are shrieval, and the President did not 
refer to S v D,31 an early case in which Sheriff McPartlin accepted the combined submission of 
counsel that Brussels II bis applied to allocate jurisdiction between the legal systems of the UK. A 
“preponderant view”,32 however, may be said to have emerged that Brussels II bis does not apply as 
between territories of the United Kingdom, and Sir James stated plainly that Brussels II bis did not 
apply to the case, the instrument having no application to issues arising between territorial units 
within the same Member State.33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), 
art 25.  
25 The UK normally legislates so as to have a Regulation apply intra-UK. 
26 See, for comment, K Beevers and D McClean, ‘Intra-UK Jurisdiction in Parental Responsibility Cases: Has 
Europe Intervened’ [2005] International Family Law 129; K J Hood, Conflict of Laws within the UK (2007) 
OUP, 5.38 – 5.49;  J M Scott, ‘Choice of Forum – Jurisdictional Issues within the UK’ (2007), paper delivered 
at the Advanced Family Law Conference, Law Society of Scotland; ‘G Maher, ‘Parental responsibility 
proceedings: intra UK jurisdiction and the European regulation’ 2007 S.L.T. (News) 117-121; G Maher, 
‘Family law proceedings and intra-UK jurisdiction’ 2008 J.R. 315-317; and A Inglis, ‘A Muckle Midden 
Cleared’ 2009 J.R. 285. 
27 Re PC, YC and KM (Brussels IIR) [2013] EWHC 2336 (Fam), per Baker J at 11.  
28 In the Matter of W-B (a Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 592 – see per McFarlane LJ at [12]; Re PC, YC and KM 
(Brussels IIR) [2013] EWHC 2336 (Fam) – see per Baker J at 11; and An English Local Authority v X, Y and Z 
(English Care Proceedings: Scottish Child) [2015] EWFC 89. 
29 Re ESJ A Minor (Residence Order Application; Jurisdiction within United Kingdom; Applicability of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003) [2008] NI Fam 6, in which Morgan J rejected a submission that art 66 should 
be interpreted so as to apply Brussels II bis to a jurisdictional dispute between Northern Ireland and England. 
30 G. O. T. v K. J. K. unreported (Court Ref. No.: F 37/05; Sheriffdom of South Strathclyde, Dumfries and 
Galloway at Dumfries, 12 December 2012) (– see especially per Sheriff Jamieson at [24]); and B v B 2009 
S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 24. 
31 2007 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 37. 
32 An English Local Authority v X (Child), Y (Mother), Z (Father) [2015] EWFC 89, per Peter Jackson J at [16]. 
cf. the “orthodox view” referred to in Re PC, YC and KM (Brussels IIR) [2013] EWHC 2336 (Fam), per Baker J 
at [11]. 
33 Para 52. 
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Even if the President had accorded the regulation an expansive rather than a restrictive interpretation, 
a question yet might have arisen regarding the subject matter scope of Brussels II bis.34 Article 1.1(b) 
provides that the regulation shall apply to, inter alia, “the delegation, restriction or termination of 
parental responsibility”.35 Article 1.2(d) specifically includes within the scope of the instrument “the 
placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care”. Although article 1.3(g) expressly 
excludes from the scope “measures taken as a result of criminal offences committed by children”, the 
grant of a secure accommodation order is not necessarily based upon evidence of criminality. That 
being so, orders placing children in secure accommodation prima facie are likely to fall (in qualifying, 
inter-Member State cases) within the subject matter scope of Brussels II bis, an inference supported 
by Sir James’ citation36 of Irish cases concerning the applicability of the regulation to Irish/English 
cases on the secure accommodation of children.  
 
Non-applicability of Family Law Act 1986 
The European Communities (Matrimonial and Parental Responsibility Jurisdiction and Judgments) 
(Scotland) Regulations 200537 make no mention of sections 27–29 of the Family Law Act 1986 
(hereinafter “1986 Act”38), covering registration and enforcement of parental responsibility orders 
intra-UK, and so it is to be assumed that these provisions continue to operate intra-UK, irrespective of 
the recognition and enforcement provisions in Brussels II bis (Ch. III).  However, in the same way 
that Sir James held Brussels II bis to be inapplicable to the instant case, so too he held that Part I of 
the 1986 Act did not apply since it is concerned “essentially”39 only with private law proceedings. A 
“Part I order” means, inter alia, a section 8 order made by a court in England and Wales under the 
Children Act 1989, other than an order varying or discharging such an order;40 and an order made by 
a court of civil jurisdiction in Scotland under any enactment or rule of law with respect to the 
residence, custody, care or control of a child, contact with or access to a child or the education or 
upbringing of a child, excluding, however, an order committing the care of a child to a local authority 
or placing a child under the supervision of a local authority.41 In determining the applicability of the 
various legislative provisions potentially engaged in this matter, the public/private law distinction 
must be kept in mind.    
                                                          
34 Art 1. 
35 The term “parental responsibility” is defined in art 2(7) as meaning “all rights and duties relating to the person 
or the property of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an 
agreement having legal effect” (emphasis added). 
36 Para 53. 
37 SSI 2005/42. 
38 Recently described as a “legislative thicket”: AS v TH, BC, NC, SH [2016] EWHC 2825 (Fam), per 
MacDonald J at [25] and [42]. 
See, however, changes to the 1986 Act made per The Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children (International Obligations) (Scotland) Regulations 2010 (SSI 2010/213), Sch.1, paras 2 – 5.  
39 Para 57. 
40 Section 1(1)(a), 1986 Act. 
41 Section 1(1)(b)(i), 1986 Act. 




Recourse to the nobile officium 
The President observed that, in order to have the English secure accommodation order enforced in 
Scotland, petition would have to be made by the two local authorities to the nobile officium of the 
Court of Session, that is, the extraordinary equitable power vested in that Court.42   
 
“[The Court of Session] is a court of equity as well as of law; and as such, may and ought to 
proceed by the rules of conscience, in abating the rigour of the law, and in giving aid, in the 
actions brought before them, to those who can have no remedy in a court of law.”43  
 
In searching for a remedy to the problem at hand, it may be noted that the power is utilised in 
international private law in the enforcement of foreign civil and commercial judgments emanating 
from legal systems with which the United Kingdom enjoys no reciprocal regime.44 This inherent 
jurisdiction of the Scots court is comparable with the inherent jurisdiction of the English court, on 
which Sir James relied in the instant case in order to supply jurisdiction in England, and it is 
noteworthy that the equivalent equitable jurisdiction is proposed to be relied upon in Scotland for the 
enforcement of that English order. However, while it is expedient that such equitable powers exist and 
exceptionally can supply the lack in appropriate cases – “… the common law is the great safety net 
which lies behind all statute law and is capable of filling gaps left by that law”45 – the nobile officium 
is not an apposite mechanism for the enforcement of an English secure accommodation order which, 
by its nature, necessitates monitoring and review. As the President recognised, a decision (by whom, 
and on what basis?) would need to be taken on the question whether the Scots or the English court 
should discharge that responsibility.46   
 
Filling the lacunae 
Legislative provision regarding the enforcement in England of a compulsory supervision order or 
interim compulsory supervision order made by a court in Scotland, on the face of things, is 
adequate.47 Conversely, provision for the recognition and enforcement in Scotland of a secure 
accommodation order made in England, has been shown to be lacking.48 The number of cases raising 
                                                          
42 Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Book IV, Title 3, para 1.  
43 Erskine, Institute of the Law of Scotland, Book 1, Title III, para 22. 
44 E B Crawford and J M Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective, 4th edition (2015) 
W.Green, para 9-09. 
45 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 W.L.R. 1025, [1990] 2 A.C. 1, per Lord Donaldson of 
Lymington M.R., at 13. 
46 Para 71. 
47 Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (Consequential and Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 
2013 (SI 2013/1465). See n 13, above.  
48 Para 62.  
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this problem is uncertain, but it is clear that in those cases where it occurs, the matter is of great 
moment, and the President opined that remedial action is necessary.  
 
While it is appropriate that the lacunae identified by this case should be filled, we suggest that the 
particular issues raised are merely one manifestation of the many difficulties and legitimate doubts 
which pertain to jurisdiction allocation and judgment enforcement in family (especially child) law 
matters as between legal systems of the UK. It is time for the legislative thicket to be pruned, and to 
make clear the rules which operate intra-UK – a pressing matter in itself, but also in preparation for 
such changes in the law governing international jurisdiction allocation and judgment enforcement as 
will be required by the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.    
 
 
Word count: 2,891 (4,181 with footnotes). 
